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THE  CLASSICAL  CONCEPT OF  THE 
LENDER OF  LAST  RESORT 
Within  the  past  ten  years,  a  series  of  events  has 
raised  questions  about  the  soundness  of  modern  fi- 
nancial  systems  and  reawakened  interest  in  what  is 
known  among  monetary  economists  as  the  lender  of 
last  resort  responsibilities  of  the  central  bank.  The 
concept  of  lender  of  last  resort  relates  to  the  question 
of  how  a  central  bank  should  react  to  a  financial 
crisis  and  involves,  in  particular,  a  prescription  for 
central  bank  action  to  preserve  the  liquidity  of  the 
financial  system  and  to  forestall  financial  panic.  The 
term  itself  originated  in  the  writings  of  Walter  Bage- 
hot,  a  leading  British  writer  in  banking  and  finance 
in  the  second  half  of  the  19th  century.  But  the  idea 
behind  it  is  of  an  earlier  vintage  and  several  well- 
specified  prescriptions  for  central  bank  action  to 
prevent  panic  can  be  found,  in  particular,  in  the 
copious  literature  centering  around  the  problems  of 
the  Bank  of  England  in  the  period  1797  to  1844. 
Among  the  more  dramatic  of  recent  events  which 
have  revived  interest  in  the  lender  of  last  resort 
function  have  been  the  credit  crunch  of  1966,  the 
credit  squeeze  in  the  commercial  paper  market  in 
1970  associated  with  the  Penn-Central  crisis,  and, 
most  recently,  the  distress  and  ultimate  demise  of 
Franklin  National  Bank.  In  each  of  these  cases,  the 
actions  of  the  Federal  Reserve  and  other  bank  regu- 
latory  authorities  provoked  discussion  centering  on 
the  following  interrelated  issues. 
1.  What  is  the  appropriate  response  of  a central  bank 
in  times  of  financial  crisis?  Should  it  try  to  prevent 
or  forestall  an  initial  bank  failure  that  might  trigger  a 
panic?  Or  should  it  act  only  to  prevent  the  primary 
failure  from  spreading  to  other  institutions?  These 
alternative  responses  correspond  to  two  contrasting 
views  of  the  duty  of  the  lender  of  last  resort.  The 
first  holds  that  the  central  bank’s  job  is  to  prevent 
the  occurrence  of  shocks  or  at  least  minimize  their 
initial  impact  on  the  financial  system.  A  second  view 
is  that  the  lender  of  last  resort  exists  not  to  prevent 
shocks,  but  rather  to  minimize  the  adverse  repercus- 
sions  of  such  shocks  either  by  insulating  the  sound 
institutions  from  the  distress  of  the  unsound  ones  or 
by  insuring  that  the  banking  system  is  sufficiently 
strong  and  resilient  to  absorb  shocks. 
2.  Is  the  lender  of  last  resort’s  primary  responsibility 
to  the  individual  bank  or  to  the  market,  i.e.,  the  bank- 
ing  system  as  a  whole?  Does  this  responsibility 
extend  to  other  sectors  of  the  financial  system? 
3.  How  and  on  what  terms  should  the 
resort  make  aid  available?  Via  open  market  oper- 
lender  of  last 
ations?  Emergency  loans  through  the  discount  win- 
dow?  If  the  latter,  should  a  penalty  rate  be  charged? 
4.  Is  the  central  bank’s  crisis-averting  function  in 
conflict  with  its  monetary-control  function?  Can  the 
bank  effectively  act  as  an  unconstrained  last-resort 
lender  within  a  policy  framework  emphasizing  stable 
monetary  growth? 
5.  What  is  the  overriding  objective  of  the  lender  of 
last  resort?  To  prevent  bank  failures  per  se?  To 
arrest  a  massive  forced  sale  of  assets  and  the  conse- 
quent  collapse  of  asset  values?  To  insure  that  finan- 
cial  institutions  will  be  able  to  meet  their  loan  com- 
mitments?  Or  to  prevent  panic-induced  reductions  in 
the  money  stock? 
6.  How  has  the  central  bank’s  lender  of  last  resort 
function  been  influenced  by  (1)  the  availability  of 
deposit  insurance  and  (2)  the  FDIC’s  procedure  in 
handling  bank  failures? 
The  current  debate  over  these  issues  has  been 
confined  to  a  rather  esoteric  circle  of  professional 
experts.  It  has  not  produced-nor  will  it  likely 
produce-anything  like  the  rich  literature  generated 
by  the  running  debate  over  similar  issues  in  19th 
century  England.  For  that  matter,  it  appears  to 
have  been  carried  on  with  little  in  the  way  of  refer- 
ence  to  this  earlier  literature.  One  result  is  that  the 
lender  of  last  resort  concept  itself  appears  to  have 
lost  some  of  the  clarity  and  precision  of  its  original 
formulation,  which  embodied  a  specific  set  of  policy 
rules  and  precepts.  The  term  “lender  of  last  resort” 
has  been  bandied  about  freely  but  it  is  clear  that  the 
meaning  it  now  conveys  varies,  and  perhaps  widely, 
from  user  to  user,  In  particular,  the  term  has  not 
always  been  used  to  convey  the  sense  intended  by  its 
classical  framers. 
It  should  be  noted  at  the  outset  that  the  pristine 
notion  of  lender  of  last  resort  emerged  as  a  prescrip- 
tion  for  central  bank  action  in  an  English  banking  and 
monetary  system  that  differed  markedly  from  that  in 
the  U.S.  in  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century.  For 
one  thing,  the  U.S.,  unlike  19th  century  Britain,  is 
no  longer  on  the  gold  standard,  the  last  effective  link 
between  gold  and  the  money  supply  having  been 
severed  in  1968.  Departure  from  the  gold  standard 
removes  one  constraint  on  the  lender  of  last  resort, 
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and  preserving  the  gold  convertibility  of  paper  cur- 
rency  at  a  fixed  rate  of  exchange.  A  second  differ- 
ence  between  the  two  financial  systems  was  created 
in  the  1930’s  by  the  introduction  of  Federal  deposit 
insurance,  an  innovation  that  now  protects  the  U.S. 
banking  system  and  most  depositors.  Deposit  insur- 
ance  has  removed  a  chief  cause  of  panics  and  bank 
runs,  namely  loss  of  public  confidence  in  the  banking 
system’s  ability  to  convert  demand  deposits  into 
cash.  Consequently,  there  is  now  less  danger  of  the 
recurrence  of  old-fashioned  cash  drains,  i.e.,  those 
massive,  panic-induced  withdrawals  of  coin  and  cur- 
rency,  which,  in  fractional  reserve  banking  systems, 
used  to  be  a chief  source  of multiple  reductions  in  the 
money  stock.  Third,  the  essentially  unit-banking 
system  in  this  country,  featuring  literally  thousands 
of  banks  operating  in  market  areas  limited  geograph- 
ically,  contrasts  with  the  incipient  branch  banking 
system  of late  19th  century  England,  in  which  a  rela- 
tively  small  number  of banks  were  beginning  to  serve 
an  essentially  national  market.  A  branch  system  with 
its  capability  of  channeling  funds  quickly  from  the 
financial  center  to  outlying  areas  may  have  less  need 
for  last-resort  loans  than  a  unit  system  in  which 
individual  banks  or  localities  lack  adequate  access  to 
money  market  supplies  of  cash.  These  and  other  key 
differences  in  banking  and  monetary  environments 
account  for  many  of  the  variations  wrought  on  the 
classical  lender  of  last  resort  concept  in  this  country. 
Given  the  current  interest  in  the  lender  of  last 
resort  function,  it  is  useful  to  examine  the  original 
version  of  that  concept  if  only  for  purposes  of  clari- 
fication  and  historical  perspective.  This  article.  there- 
fore,  traces  the  emergence  of  the  classical  doctrine  of 
the  lender  of last  resort  in  19th  century  England  and 
discusses  the  content  of  that  doctrine.  The  first 
section  of  the  article  extracts  from  the  writings  of 
leading  19th  century  banking  theorists  the  basic 
tenets  of  the  classical  doctrine.  These  tenets  are 
then  listed  in  the  second  and  concluding  section. 
NINETEENTH CENTURY VIEWS  OF  THE DUTIES 
OF  THE LENDER OF  LAST RESORT 
Henry  Thornton  The  principal  architects  of  the 
classical  lender  of  last  resort  doctrine  were  Henry 
Thornton,  who  wrote  at  the  beginning  of  the  nine- 
teenth  century,  and  Walter  Bagehot,  whose  chief 
writings  appeared  during  the  third  quarter  of  the 
century.  In  his  1802  classic,  The  Paper  Credit  of 
Great  Britain,  Thornton  expounded  on  many  issues 
relating  to  central  banking,  but  four  in  particular  are 
especially  relevant  today.  The  first  concerns  a  pos- 
sible  conflict  between  the  central  bank’s  responsi- 
bility  as  controller  of  the  money  supply  and  its  func- 
tion  as  lender  of  last  resort.  To  the  extent  that  the 
central  bank  bears  the  responsibility  for  providing  a 
stable  framework  of  monetary  growth,  it  must  exer- 
cise  a  moderate  and  continued  restraint  on  the  rate 
of  monetary  expansion.  But  coping  with  unusual 
liquidity  strains  through  exercise  of  the  lender  of 
last  resort  function  calls  for  abandonment  of  this 
restraint  and  relinquishing  control  over  monetary 
growth.  Hence,  some  banking  specialists  have  noted 
an  apparent  conflict  between  these  two  central  bank- 
ing  objectives. 
Thornton,  however,  saw  no  inconsistency  between 
a  policy  of  stable  monetary  growth  and  the  sort  of 
action  required  to  deal  with  liquidity  crises.  In  the 
foliowing  passage,  which  Joseph  Schumpeter  has 
called  the  Magna  Charta  of  central  banking,  Thorn- 
ton  distinguishes  between  the  long-run  target  growth 
path  of  the  money  stock  and  temporary  emergency 
deviations  from  the  path.  The  proper  policy  of  the 
Bank  of  England,  Thornton  says,  is 
To  limit  the  total  amount  of  paper  issued,  and  to 
resort  for  this  purpose,  whenever  the  temptation  to 
borrow  is  strong,  to  some  effectual  principle  of 
restriction;  in  no  case,  however,  materially  to  di- 
minish  the  sum  in  circulation,  but  to  let  it  vibrate 
only  within  certain  limits;  to  afford  a  slow  and 
cautious  extension  of  it,  as  the  general  trade  of  the 
kingdom  enlarges  itself;  to  allow  of  some  special, 
though  temporary,  increase  in  the  event  of  any 
extraordinary  alarm  or  difficulty,  as  the  best 
means  of  preventing  a  great  demand  at  home  for 
guineas*  ;  and  to  lean  to  the  side  of  diminution  in 
exchanges of  gold  going  abroad,  and  of  the  general 
exchanges  continuing  long  unfavourable;  this  seems 
to  be  the  true  policy of  the  directors  of  an  institu- 
tion  circumstanced  like  that  of  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land.  To  suffer  either  the  solicitations  of  mer- 
chants,  or  the  wishes  of  government,  to  determine 
the  measure  of  the  bank  issues,  is unquestionably  to 
adopt  a  very  false  principle  of  conduct.  [2 ;  259] 
Thus,  to  Thornton,  the  main  responsibility  of  the 
central  bank  was  to  regulate  the  money  stock  so  that 
it  expands  at  a steady  pace  roughly  comparable  to the 
long-term  trend  growth  rate  of  output.  But  the  bank 
must  also  counter  those  severe  specie  drains  that  peri- 
odically  threatened  to  deplete  its  gold  reserve  and 
force  suspension  of convertibility.  These  drains  were 
of  two  types:  (1)  external  or  foreign,  composed  of 
exports  of  gold  to  cover  an  adverse  balance  of  pay- 
ments  in  the  country’s  international  accounts  and  (2) 
internal,  consisting  of  panic-induced  increases  in  the 
quantity  of  gold  held  by  domestic  residents.  External 
drains  call  for  a  restrictive  policy.  In  the  case  of  a 
*Thornton  is  here  referring  to  the  public’s  demand  for  gold  coin. 
the  guinea  being  the  name  for  the  standard  gold  coin  in  use  in 
England  at  the  time. 
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prepared  temporarily  to  expand  sharply  its  note  issue 
and  its  loans  in  order  to  satisfy  the  public’s  demand 
for  liquidity.  There  need  be  no  conflict  between  the 
monetary  control  and  lender  of  last  resort  functions, 
however,  since  the  first  refers  to  the  long  run  and 
the  second  to  temporary  periods  of  emergency.  If 
the  central  bank,  in  its  role  as  lender  of  last  resort, 
responds  appropriately  to  the  threat  of  a  liquidity 
crisis,  the  panic  will  be  averted  quickly.  Conse- 
quently,  the  deviation  of  the  money  stock  from  its 
long-run  target  path  will  be  small,  both  in  magnitude 
and  duration. 
The  second  issue  considered  by  Thornton  concerns 
the  extent  of  the lender  of  last  resort’s  responsibility 
to  individual  banks  as  opposed  to  the  banking  system 
as  a  whole.  Are  these  responsibilities  strongly  inter- 
related?  Are  banks  so  interdependent  that  the  failure 
of  one  would  endanger  ail  the  others?  Is  it  therefore 
necessary  that  the  lender  prevent  the  failure  of  even 
unsound  banks,  i.e.,  are  rescue  operations  necessary 
to  preserve  the  stability  of  the  payments  mechanism? 
Thornton’s  answer  is  as  follows: 
It is by no means intended to imply,  that it would 
become  the  Bank  of  England  to  relieve  every  dis- 
tress  which  the  rashness  of  country  banks  may 
bring  upon them:  the bank, by doing  this, might  en- 
courage  their  improvidence.  There  seems  to  be  a 
medium  at  which  a  public  bank  should  aim  in 
granting  aid  to  inferior  establishments,  and  which 
it  must  often  find  very  difficult  to  be  observed. 
The  relief  should  neither  be  so prompt  and  liberal 
as  to  exempt  those  who  misconduct  their  business 
from  all  the  natural  consequences  of  their  fault, 
nor  so  scanty  and  slow  as  deeply  to  involve  the 
general  interests.  These interests,  nevertheless,  are 
sure to be pleaded by every  distressed person whose 
affairs  are  large,  however  indifferent  or  even 
ruinous  may  be their  state.  [2 ;  188] 
Thornton,  in  this  passage,  makes  four  key  points. 
First,  the  lender  of last  resort’s  primary  responsibility 
is  to  the  market  (“the  general  interests”)  and  not  to 
the  individual  bank.  The  central  bank  has  no  duty 
to  sustain  particular  institutions.  Second,  he  advises 
against  bail-out  operations  for  banks  whose  distress 
arises  from  “rashness,”  “improvidence,”  or  “miscon- 
duct.”  By  subsidizing  the  risk-bearing  function  of 
poorly-managed  banks,  such  rescue  operations,  he 
says,  would  encourage  other  banks  to  take  excessive 
speculative  risks  without  fear  of the  consequences.  In 
short,  individual  imprudence  should  be  punished  by 
losses.  Only  if  the  financial  repercussions  of  such 
punishment  threaten  to  become  widespread  should 
the  lender  of  last  resort  intervene.  His  third  point, 
however,  is  that  even  in  this  latter  case,  aid  should 
be  extended  sparingly  and  on  relatively  unfavorable 
terms.  Finally,  he  is  skeptical  of  the  claim  that  eco- 
nomic  welfare  is  inevitably  harmed  when  a  bank  fails. 
This  argument,  he  notes,  would  provide  every  large 
bank,  no  matter  how  poorly  run,  with  an  automatic 
justification  for  aid.  He  is  aware  that  occasionally 
the  public  interest  may  be  better  served  by  the  de- 
mise  of  inefficient  banks,  i.e.,  that  the  resulting  im- 
provements  in  resource  allocation  may  outweigh  any 
adverse  spillover  side  effects  of the  failure. 
The  third  issue  addressed  by  Thornton  was  wheth- 
er  the  lender  of  last  resort  should  try  to  prevent 
shocks  to  the  financial  system.  Here  Thornton  an- 
swered  in  the  negative.  The  lender  of  last  resort 
exists,  he  said,  not  to  prevent  shocks  but  to  minimize 
the  secondary  repercussions  following  upon  shocks. 
He  argued  that  a  panic  could  be  triggered  by  any 
kind  of  “alarm,”  e.g.,  rumors  of  a  foreign  invasion, 
an  initial  bank  failure,  etc.  The  central  bank  has  no 
responsibility  for  stopping  these  triggering  events. 
But  it  does  have  a  responsibility  for  arresting  the 
panic  and  stopping  it  from  spreading  throughout  the 
system.  In  his  own  words, 
.  .  .  If  any  one  bank  fails,  a  general  run  on  the 
neighboring  ones is  apt  to  take  place  which  if  not 
checked  at  the  beginning  by  a  pouring  into  the 
circulation  a  large  quantity  of  gold,  leads  to  very 
extensive  mischief.  [2 ;  180] 
The  proper  response,  according  to  Thornton,  is  not 
to  stop  the  initial  failure,  but  instead  to  pump  liquid- 
ity  into  the  market.  In  Thornton’s  view,  the  actual 
occurrence  of  a  widespread  panic  would  be  properly 
attributable  not  to  the  event  of the  initial  bank  failure, 
but  to  the  failure  of  the  central  bank  to  insulate  the 
economy  from  the  impact  of  that  event.  In  this 
regard,  he  distinguished  between  the  effects  of  (1) 
the  closing  of  an  individual  bank  and  (2)  policy 
errors  of  the  lender  of  last  resort.  The  closing  of  an 
individual  bank,  he  says,  by  itself  contributes  very 
little  to  “general  distress”  or  “general  commercial 
difficulty.”  By  contrast,  policy  errors  of  the  lender 
of  last  resort  create  “a  general  shock  to  credit”  that 
“produces  Distress  through  the  whole  Kingdom.” 
[2  ; 287-8,  304-5] 
Finally,  Thornton  identified  the  paramount  objec- 
tive  or  primary  purpose  of  the  lender  of  last  resort. 
Today,  opinion  varies  as  to  the  lender’s  ultimate 
objective,  with  all  of  the  following  being  mentioned: 
(1)  preventing  widespread  bank  failures,  (2)  pre- 
serving  confidence  in  the  banking  system,  (3)  pre- 
venting  a  massive  dumping  of  assets  and  the  conse- 
quent  collapse  of  asset  values,  (4)  guarding  against 
the  danger  of  massive  currency  withdrawals,  and  (5) 
insuring  that  banks  and  other  lending  institutions 
will  be  able  to  meet  their  loan  commitments.  Thorn- 
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riding  objective  as  the  prevention  of  panic-induced 
declines  in  the  money  stock,  declines  that  might  pro- 
duce  depressions  in  the  level  of  economic  activity. 
The  threat  of  a  panic,  he  argued,  tends  to  cause 
substantial  shifts  both  in  the  public’s  preferences  re- 
garding  the  forms  in  which  money  balances  are  held 
and  bankers’  preferences  concerning  the  volume  of 
monetary  liabilities-notes  and  deposits-they  are 
willing  to  create  per  unit  of  reserves.  Financial 
crises  or  other  alarms  shake  the  public’s  confidence  in 
the  ability  of  the  banking  system  to  convert  its  note 
and  deposit  liabilities  into  gold.  Consequently,  in- 
dividuals  suddenly  desire  to  hold  a  larger  proportion 
of  their  money  balances  in  the  form  of gold  or  equally 
safe  liquid  assets  such  as  Bank  of  England  notes. 
The  rise  in  the  desired  cash  ratio  (i.e.,  desired  gold 
holdings  as  a  proportion  of  other  types  of  money 
balances)  induces  widespread  attempts  on  the  part 
of  the  public  to  convert  notes  and  deposits  into  gold 
or  its  equivalent.  Simultaneously,  commercial  banks, 
finding  their  solvency  threatened,  will  contract  their 
note  issues  sharply  in  an  effort  to  raise  the  reserve 
ratio.  Bankers  will  want  to bolster  their  reserve  ratios 
both  to  meet  the  likely  heavy  cash  withdrawals  and 
also  to  allay  public  suspicion  of  financial  weakness. 
The  result  of  the  rise  in  the  currency  and  reserve 
ratios  is  a  contraction  in  the  money  stock,  unless 
the  central  bank  introduces  compensating  changes  in 
its  note  issue.  And  if  the  money  stock  contracts, 
Thornton  argued,  output  and  employment  will  be 
adversely  affected.  To  prevent  the  onset  of  depres- 
sion,  therefore,  the  lender  of  last  resort  must  tem- 
porarily  increase  its  note  issue  to  offset  the  impact  of 
the  rising  currency  and  reserve  ratios  on  the  money 
stock.  In  short,  by  preventing  panic-induced  contrac- 
tions  in the  money  stock,  the  lender  of last  resort  con- 
tributes  to  the  stabilization  of  real  economic  activity. 
Walter  Bagehot  The  classical  lender  of  last 
resort  doctrine  received  its  fullest  development  in  the 
writings  of  Walter  Bagehot.  In  his  seminal  1873 
volume,  Lombard  Street,  Bagehot  stressed  many  of 
the  same  points  made  earlier  by  Thornton.  Following 
Thornton,  he  distinguished  between  the  appropriate 
response  to  internal  versus  external  cash  drains.  An 
internal  drain,  he  said,  should  be  countered  by  a 
policy  of  lending  freely  and  vigorously  so  as  to  erase 
all  doubt  about  the  availability  of  bank  accommoda- 
tion.  An  external  drain,  however,  should  be  met  by a 
sharp  rise  in  the  central  bank’s  lending  rate,  the  high 
interest  rate  serving  to  attract  foreign  gold  and  en- 
couraging  the  retention  of  domestic  gold.  This  latter 
action,  Bagehot  thought,  was  necessary  to  protect 
the  nation’s  gold  reserve,  i.e.,  the  gold  component  of 
the  monetary  base.  Thus  he  stressed  that 
.  .  .  the first  duty  of  the  Bank  of  England  was  to 
protect  the  ultimate  cash  of  the  country,  and  to 
raise  the  rate  of  interest  so  as  to  protect  it.  [1 ; 
155] 
A  sufficient  gold  reserve,  of  course,  was  necessary 
both  for  the  preservation  of  the  gold  standard  and  for 
the  maintenance  of  public  confidence  in  the  gold 
convertibility  of  paper  currency.  Regarding  public 
confidence,  he  argued  that  “a  panic  is  sure  to  be 
caused”  if  the  gold  reserve  falls  below  “a  certain 
minimum  which  I  will  call  the  ‘apprehension  mini- 
mum.’  ”  [1  ;  156-7]  It  follows  that  the  lender  of 
last  resort  should  strive  to  keep  its  gold  reserves 
above  this  critical  threshold. 
Bagehot  thought  that  a  persistent  external  drain 
would  trigger  an  internal  drain  as  the  public,  observ- 
ing  the  diminution  of  the  gold  stock,  would  seek  to 
convert  deposits  and  country  bank  notes  into  gold. 
“Unless  you  can  stop  the  foreign  export,”  he  said, 
“you  cannot  allay  the  domestic  alarm.”  In  this  most 
likely  case  where  “periods  of  internal  panic  and 
external  demand  for  bullion  commonly  occur  to- 
gether,”  the  lender  of  last  resort  must 
.  .  .  treat  two  opposite  maladies  at  once-one  re- 
quiring  stringent  remedies,  and  especially  a  rapid 
rise  in the rate  of  interest;  and the  other,  an alle- 
viative  treatment  with  large  and  ready  loans.  [l; 
27] 
Therefore,  “the  best  remedy  . . . when  a foreign  drain 
is  added  to  a  domestic  drain”  is  the  provision  of 
“very  large  loans  at  very  high  rates.”  [1;  27,  28] 
Here  is  the  origin  of  the  famous  Bagehot  Rule- 
“lend  freely  at  a  high  rate.” 
Like  Thornton,  Bagehot  stressed  that  last-resort 
lending  should  not  be  a  continuous  practice  but 
rather  a  temporary  emergency  measure  applicable 
only  in  times  of  banking  panics.  And,  in  perfect 
accord  with  his  predecessor,  Bagehot  argued  that  if 
the  central  bank  responded  promptly  and  vigorously, 
the  panic  would  be  ended  in  a  few  days,  by  impli- 
cation  an  interval  not  long  enough  for  the  money 
stock  to  depart  significantly  from  its  appropriate 
long-run  growing track. 
Bagehot  also  viewed  the  lender  of  last  resort  as  a 
primarily  macroeconomic  concept.  The  central  bank, 
he  said,  bears  the  responsibility  of  guaranteeing  the 
liquidity  of  the  whole  economy  but  not  that  of  par- 
ticular  institutions  in  the  economy.  He  prescribed 
last-resort  lending  as  a  remedy  solely  for  pervasive 
general  emergencies  affecting  the  entire  banking  sys- 
tem.  He  did  not  prescribe  the  remedy  for  isolated 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK  OF  RICHMOND  5 emergency  situations  affecting  an  individual  bank  or 
a few  specific  banks.  Nor  did  he  intend  it  to  be  used 
to  prevent  very  large  or  key  banks  from  failing  as  a 
consequence  of  poor  management  and  inefficiency. 
As  shown  below,  he  did  not  think  that  support  of 
such  distressed  key  banks  was  necessary  to  forestall 
panics.  Like  Thornton,  he  emphasized  that  the  task 
of  the  central  bank  was  not  to  prevent  initial  failures 
but  rather  to  prevent  a  wave  of  failures  spreading 
through  the  system. 
Bagehot  also  followed  Thornton  in  arguing  that 
the  lender  of  last  resort  exists  not  to  prevent  shocks 
but  to  minimize  the  secondary  repercussions  follow- 
ing  upon  shocks.  His  views  on  this  point  are  con- 
tained  in  his  analysis  of  panics.  A  panic,  he  said, 
can  be  triggered  by  a  variety  of  exogenous  events- 
“a  bad  harvest,  an  apprehension  of  foreign  invasion, 
a  sudden  failure  of  a  great  firm  which  everybody 
trusted.”  [1; 61]  But  “no  cause  is  more  capable  of 
producing  a  panic,  perhaps  none  is  so  capable,  as  the 
failure  of  a  first-rate  joint  stock  bank  in  London.” 
[1  ;  29]  The  shock  of  this  initial  failure  must  be 
contained  before  it  gets  out  of  hand,  for  “in  wild 
periods  of  alarm,  one  failure  makes  many.”  The 
problem  is  how  to  “arrest  the  primary  failure”  that 
causes  “the  derivative  failures.”  Bagehot’s  solution, 
quoted  below,  stresses  the  liberal  provision  of  liquid- 
ity  to  the  whole  system  rather  than  loans  to  the 
distressed  bank. 
A  panic,  in  a word,  is  a  species  of  neuralgia,  and 
according  to  the  rules  of  science  you  must  not 
starve  it.  The holders  of  the cash  reserve  must  be 
ready  not  only  to  keep  it  for  their  own  liabilities, 
but  to  advance  it  most  freely  for  the  liabilities  of 
others.  They  must  lend  to  merchants.  to  minor 
bankers,  to  ‘this  man  and  that  man,’  whenever  the 
security  is good  . . . .  The  way  in which  the panic 
of  1825 was  stopped  by  advancing  money  has-been 
described  in  so  broad  and  graphic  a  way  that  the 
passage  has  become  classical.  ‘We  lent  it,’  said 
Mr. Harmon,  on behalf  of  the Bank of  England,  ‘by 
every  possible  means  and  in  modes  we  had  never 
adopted  before;  we  took  in  stock  on  security,  we 
purchased  Exchequer  bills,  we  made  advances  on 
Exchequer  bills,  we  not  only  discounted  outright, 
but  we  made  advances  on  the  deposit  of  bills  of 
exchange  to  an  immense  amount,  in  short,  by 
every  possible  means  consistent  with  the  safety  of 
the bank,  and we  were  not  on some occasions  over- 
nice.  Seeing  the dreadful  state in which  the public 
were,  we  rendered  every  assistance  in  our  power.’ 
After  a  day  or  two  of  this  treatment,  the  entire 
panic  subsided,  and  the  ‘City’  was  quite  calm. 
[1 ;  25] 
Conspicuously  absent  is  any  mention  of  the  need  to 
channel  aid  to  specific  institutions,  as  would  be  im- 
plied  by  bail-out  operations.  Bagehot’s  emphasis  is 
clearly  on  aid  to  the  market  rather  than  to  the  ini- 
tially  distressed  bank.  He  obviously  did  not  think  it 
necessary  to  prevent  the  initial  failure  at  all  costs. 
Up  to  this  point,  Bagehot  has  been  depicted  largely 
as  a  follower  or  disciple  of  Thornton.  But  Bagehot 
did  more  than  just  elaborate,  refine,  and  coordinate 
Thornton’s  analysis.  He  also  contributed  several 
original  points  that  added  substance  to  the  lender  of 
last  resort  doctrine  and  advanced  it  beyond  Thorn- 
ton’s  formulation.  At  least  five  of  these  points  de- 
serve  mention. 
First,  Bagehot  distinguished  between  the  central 
bank’s  extending  support  to  the  market  after  a  crisis 
began  and  its  giving  assurance  of  support  in  advance 
of  an  impending  crisis.  He  argued  that  the  lender 
of  last  resort’s  duty  did  not  stop  with  the  actual  pro- 
vision  of  liquidity  in  times  of  crisis,  but  also  involved 
making  it  clear  in  advance  that  it  would  lend  freely 
in  all  crises.  As  he  put  it, 
.  .  . the public  have  a  right  to  know  whether  [the 
central  bank]-the  holders  of  our  ultimate  bank. 
reserve-acknowledge  this  duty,  and  are  ready  to 
perform  it.  [1 ;  85] 
This  assurance  alone,  he  thought,  would  dispel  uncer- 
tainty  about  and  promote  confidence  in  the  central 
bank’s  willingness  to  act,  thus  generating  a  pattern 
of  stabilizing  expectations  that  would  help  avert 
future  panics. 
Second,  he  advocated  that  last  resort  accommo- 
dation  be  made  at  a  penalty  rate.  Borrowers  should 
have  relief  in  times  of  crisis,  but  they  should  be  pre- 
pared  to  pay  a  price  that  implied  a  stiff  penalty.  The 
central  bank  has  a  duty  to  lend,  but  it  should  extract 
a  high  price  for  its  loans.  A  penalty  rate  had  the 
appeal  of  distributional  equity,  it  being  only  fair  that 
borrowers  should  pay  handsomely  for  the  protection 
and  security  afforded  by  the  lender  of  last  resort. 
Distributive  justice  aside,  the  penalty  rate,  Bagehot 
claimed,  would  produce  at  least  three  additional  bene- 
ficial  results.  First,  it  would  encourage  the  importa- 
tion  and  prevent  the  exportation  of  specie,  thus  pro- 
tecting  the  nation’s  gold  reserve.  It  would  achieve 
this  result  (1)  by  attracting  short-term  capital  from 
abroad,  and  (2)  by  exerting  a  deflationary  influence 
on  the  level  of  economic  activity  and  domestic  prices, 
thus  improving  the  external  balance  of trade.  Second, 
the  high  rate  of  interest  would  reduce  the  quantity  of 
precautionary  cash  balances  that  overcautious  wealth- 
holders  would  want  to  hold.  Without  the  high  rate 
to  deter  them,  these  cashholders  might  deplete  the 
central  gold  reserve.  As  Bagehot  put  it,  the  penalty 
rate  would  serve  as “a  heavy  fine  on  unreasonable 
timidity,”  prompting  potential  cashholders  to  econo- 
mize  on  the  nation’s  scarce  gold  reserve.  [1 ;  97]  In 
this  connection,  he  advocated  that  the  penalty  rate  be 
established 
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early;  that  no  one  may  borrow  out  of  idle  precau- 
tion  without  paying  well  for  it;  that  the  Banking 
reserve  may  be protected  as far  as possible.  [1 ;  97] 
Last  and  most  important,  the  penalty  rate  would 
provide  an  incentive  for  banks  to  exhaust  all  market 
sources  of  liquidity  and  even  develop  new  sources 
before  coming  to  the  central  bank.  By  encouraging 
individual  banks  to  develop  better  techniques  of 
money  management  and  the  capital  market  to  develop 
new  channels  to  mobilize  existing  liquidity,  the  pen- 
alty  rate  would  promote  allocative  efficiency  in  the 
financial  system.  In  short,  the  penalty  rate  would 
protect  the  gold  reserve,  strengthen  the  free  market, 
discourage  reliance  on  the  central  bank,  and  insure 
that  recourse  to  the  latter’s  lending  facilities  was 
truly  a  last  resort. 
Bagehot’s  analysis,  it  should  be  noted,  implies  still 
another  use  for  the  penalty  rate,  namely  that  of  pro- 
viding  a test  of the  soundness  of distressed  borrowers. 
A  penalty  rate  set  a couple  of  percentage  points  above 
the  market  rate  on  alternative  sources  of  funds  would 
encourage  illiquid  banks  to  turn  to  the  market  first. 
Success  in  obtaining  accommodation  at  the  market 
rate  would  indicate  that  lenders  judge  these  borrow- 
ers  to  be  a  sound  risk.  The  borrowers  and  their 
assets  would  pass  the  market  test.  On  the  other  hand, 
resort  to  the  central  bank  would  tend  to  indicate 
weaknesses  in  the  borrowing  institutions.  The  banks 
may  be  unable  to  borrow  in  the  market  at  the  lower 
rate.  Fearing  default,  lenders  may  demand  a  risk 
premium  in  excess  of  the  difference  between  the  mar- 
ket  and  the  penal  rate.  The  risk  premium  would 
force  the  stockholders  of the  banks  to  make  a  decision 
either  to  close  the  banks,  to  arrange  a  merger  with 
other  banks,  or  to  resort  to  the  central  bank’s  lending 
facility.  Either  way,  the  penalty  rate  will  have  pro- 
vided  a  test  of  the  banks’  soundness. 
Bagehot’s  third  contribution  was  his  specification 
of  the  types  of  borrowers  the  lender  of  last  resort 
should  accommodate,  the  kinds  of  assets  it  should 
lend  on,  and  the  criteria  it  should  use  to  determine 
acceptability  of  those  assets.  Regarding  the  types  of 
borrowers,  Bagehot  stated  that  the  Bank  of  England 
should  be  willing  to  accommodate  anyone  with  good 
security.  Last  resort  loans,  he  said,  should  be  avail- 
able  “to  merchants,  to  minor  bankers,  to  this  man 
and  that  man.”  The  objective  of  the  central  bank  in 
time  of  panic  is  to  satisfy  the  market’s  demand  for 
liquidity.  It  makes  little  difference,  said  Bagehot, 
whether  this  objective  is  accomplished  via  loans  to 
merchants,  to  bankers,  or  to  whomever. 
Concerning  the  type  of  collateral  on  which  the 
central  bank  should  lend,  Bagehot’s  answer  was  clear. 
The  Bank  should  stand  ready  to  lend  on  any  and  all 
sound  assets,  or  as  he  put  it,  “on  every  kind  of 
current  security,  or  every  sort  on  which  money  is 
ordinarily  lent.”  Besides  the  conventionally  eligible 
bills  and  government  securities,  acceptable  collateral 
should  include  “all  good  banking  securities,”  and 
perhaps  even  “railway  debenture  stock.”  In  another 
passage  he  makes  the  point  that  the  “amount  of  the 
advance  is  the  main  consideration  .  .  . not  the  nature 
of  the  security  on  which  the  advance  is  made,  always 
assuming  the  security  to  be  good.”  The  basic  criter- 
ion  was  that  the  paper  be  indisputably  good  in 
ordinary  or  normal  times.  The  latter  qualification  is 
important.  It  implies  that  the  lender  of  last  resort 
should  not  be  afraid  to  extend  loans  on  assets  whose 
current  market  value  is  temporarily  below  book  value 
owing  to  depression  in  the  securities  market. 
To  summarize,  Bagehot  felt  that  few  restrictions 
should  be  placed  on  the  types  of  assets  the  central 
bank  might  lend  on,  or  the  kind  of  borrowers  it  might 
accommodate.  This  position  was  consistent  with  his 
advocacy  of  price  as  opposed  to  non-price  rationing 
mechanisms.  He  recommended  that  the  central  bank 
eschew  qualitative  restraints-eligibility  rules,  moral 
suasion,  administrative  discretion  and  the  like-and 
instead  rely  on  the  penalty  rate  to  ration  borrowing. 
Fourth,  Bagehot  provided  a  precise  delineation  of 
the  extent  of  the  lender  of  last  resort’s  responsibility 
to individual  banks  as  distinguished  from  the  banking 
system  as  a  whole.  Concerning  the  question  of 
whether  this  responsibility  included  assistance  to  in- 
solvent  banks,  Bagehot’s  answer  was  an  unequivocal 
no.  The  central  bank’s  duty,  he  said,  is  not  to  rescue 
“the  ‘unsound’  people”  who  constitute  “a  feeble  mi- 
nority.”  Such  businesses,  he  said,  “are  afraid  even 
to  look  frightened  for  fear  their  unsoundness  may  be 
detected.”  [1 ;  97]  In  short,  the  job  of  the  central 
bank  is  not  to  prevent  failure  at  all  costs  but  rather  to 
confine  the  impact  of  such  failure  to  the  unsound 
institutions  alone. 
Bagehot  meant  for  his  strictures  to  apply  even  to 
those  key  banks  whose  failure,  in  the  absence  of 
central  bank  action,  could  shatter  public  confidence 
and  start  a  falling-dominoes  chain-reaction  sequence 
of  financial  collapse.  Thus,  he  acknowledges  that  if 
owing  to  the  defects  in  its  government,  one  even 
of  the  greater  London  joint  stock  banks  failed, 
there  would  be  an  instant  suspicion  of  the  whole 
system. One terra  incognita  being seen to be faulty, 
every  other  terra  incognita  would  be suspected.  If 
the  real  government  of  these banks  had  for  years 
been  known,  and  if  the  subsisting  banks  had  been 
known  not  to  be ruled  by  the bad  mode  of  govern- 
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then  the  ruin  of  that  bank  would  not  be  hurtful. 
The  other  banks  would  be seen to  be exempt  from 
the  cause  which  had  destroyed  it.  But  at  present 
the ruin  of  one of  these great  banks  would  greatly 
impair  the  credit  of  all.  Scarcely  any  one  knows 
the precise  government  of  any  one;  in no case has 
that  government  been  described  on  authority;  and 
the  fall  of  one  by  grave  misgovernment  would  be 
taken  to  show  that  the  others  might  as  easily  be 
misgoverned  also.  And  a tardy  disclosure  even  of 
an  admirable  constitution  would  not  much  help 
the surviving  banks:  as  it was  extracted  by  neces- 
sity,  it would  be received  with  suspicion.  A  skepti- 
cal world  would  say ‘of  course they say they are all 
perfect  now;  it  would  not  do for  them to  say  any- 
thing  else.’  [1 ;  129] 
Even  in  this  case,  however,  Bagehot  did  not  think  it 
appropriate  for  the  central  bank  to  extend  aid  to 
poorly-governed  key  banks.  Rather  it  is  “the  ‘sound’ 
people,  the  people  who  have  good  security  to  offer” 
who  constitute  “the  majority  to  be  protected.”  The 
lender  of  last  resort  function  should  not  be  inter- 
preted  to  mean  that  unsound  banks  should  not  be 
permitted  to  fail.  Instead  it  implies  that  failure 
should  not  be  allowed  to  spread  to  sound  institutions. 
To  Bagehot,  the  distinction  is  crucial.  In  his  words, 
“no  advances  indeed  need  be  made”  on  assets  on 
“which  the  [central]  Bank  will  ultimately  lose.” 
Again,  in  another  passage  he  offers  assurance  that  if 
the  lender  of  last  resort  “should  refuse  bad  bills  or 
bad  securities”  it  “will  not  make  the  panic  really 
worse.”  To  arrest  a panic,  he  says,  it is  sufficient  that 
the  Bank  guarantee  to  provide  liquidity  to  the  “sol- 
vent  merchants  and  bankers”  who  comprise  the 
“great  majority”  of  the  market.  This  policy  assures 
that  “the  alarm  of  the  solvent  merchants  and  bankers 
will  be  stayed.”  [1 ;  97] 
Finally,  Bagehot  warned  against  undue  reliance 
on  the  lender  of  last  resort  and  stressed  the  need  to 
strengthen  individual  banks.  The  central  bank,  he 
pointed  out,  was  not  meant  to  be  a  substitute  for 
prudent  bank  practices.  Consistent  with  his  laissez- 
faire,  free  market  philosophy,  he  argued  that  the  basic 
strength  of  the  banking  system  should  rest  not  in  the 
availability  of  last  resort  accommodation  but  rather 
on  the  resources  and  soundness  of  the  individual 
banks.  In  this  connection  he  stated  that 
.  .  .  we  should  look  at  the  rest  of  our  banking 
system, and try  to reduce the demands on the Bank 
[of  England]  as  much  as  we  can.  The  central 
machinery  being  inevitably  frail,  we  should  care- 
fully  and  as  much  as  possible  diminish  the  strain 
upon  it.  [1 ;  36] 
He  described  in  glowing  terms  the  self-reliant  char- 
acter  of  “the  natural  system  of  banking,”  composed 
“of  many  banks  keeping  their  own  cash  reserve,  with 
the  penalty  of  failure  before  them  if  they  neglect  it.” 
[1 ;  160]  Elsewhere  he  pointed  out  that  “under  a 
good  system  of  banking  .  .  . a  large  number  of  banks, 
each  feeling  that  their  credit  was  at  stake  in keeping  a 
good  reserve,  probably  would  keep  one ;  if  any  one 
did  not,  it  would  be  criticized  constantly,  and  would 
soon  lose  its  standing,  and  in the  end  disappear.”  [1 ; 
52]  In  relying  on  its  own  soundness  rather  than  the 
resources  of  the  central  bank,  such  a  system,  he 
noted,  “reduces  to  a  minimum  the  risk  that  is  caused 
by  the  deposit.  If  the  national  money  can  safely  be 
deposited  in  banks  in  any  way,  this  is  the  way  to 
make  it  safe.”  [1 ;  53] 
One  final  observation  should  be  made  concerning 
Bagehot’s  views  on  the  most  appropriate  panic-com- 
bating  instrument  of  the  central  bank.  Today  many 
banking  experts  regard  open-market  operations 
rather  than  discount-window  accommodation  as  the 
most  effective  way  to  deal  with  systemic  liquidity 
crises.  Bagehot  probably  would  have  agreed.  True, 
he  consistently  prescribed  loans  rather  than  open- 
market  purchases  of  assets  as  the  means  of  stopping 
panics,  but  only  because  the  latter  weapon  was  not 
widely  used  in  his  day.  Had  the  technique  of  open 
market  operations  been  highly  developed  at  that  time, 
he  undoubtedly  would  have  approved  of  its  use,  at 
least  in  those  cases  where  there  was  no  danger  of  the 
gold  stock  being  depleted  by  a  foreign  drain.  On 
these  occasions,  Bagehot  was  for  resorting  to  the 
most  expeditious  means  of  stopping  an  internal  cash 
drain.  Open  market  operations  are  quite  consistent 
with  his  dictum  “that  in  time  of  panic”  the  central 
bank  “must  advance  freely  and  vigorously  to  the 
public  .  .  .  on  all  good  banking  securities;  and  as 
largely  as  the  public  ask  for  them.”  [1 ;  96-7] 
Moreover,  open  market  operations  also  would  have 
appealed  to  his  preference  for  market-oriented  allo- 
cation  mechanisms.  He  would  have  approved  of  this 
particular  policy  instrument,  which  regulates  the  total 
amount  of  money  but  not  its  allocation  among  users 
or  uses. 
Shortcomings  of  the  Classical  Concept  A  picture 
of  the  classical  doctrine  as  a  consistent  and  fully  self- 
contained  set  of  policy  rules  is  not  altogether  correct, 
for  the  doctrine  does  contain  several  weaknesses. 
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for  distinguishing  sound  from  unsound  institutions. 
Yet  this  is  precisely  the  kind  of  knowledge  the  lender 
of  last  resort  needs  in  deciding  whether  to  grant  or 
withhold  aid.  What  criteria  should  the  central  bank 
use  to  determine  whether  a  bank  is  solvent  or  in- 
solvent?  How  does  one  decide  which  assets  are 
good  and  which  bad?  Unfortunately  the  classical 
doctrine  does  not  say. 
Second,  the  classical  doctrine  shows  insufficient 
awareness  of the  complexities  involved  in determining 
the  condition  of  distressed  banks.  Neglected  is  the 
fact  that  the  activities  of  examination,  auditing,  in- 
vistigation,  and  analysis-all  required  for  a  proper 
determination  of  a  bank’s  condition-are  necessarily 
time-consuming  processes.  In  the  simplistic  classical 
view,  unsound  banks  are  quickly  and  irrevocably  re- 
vealed  as  bankrupt  and  are  allowed  to  fail  at  the 
outset.  In  the  real  world,  however,  things  are  seldom 
that  simple.  In  particular,  it  may  be  necessary  to 
extend  last-resort  loans  to  distressed  banks  simply 
to  purchase  the  time  required  for  the  authorities  to 
make  an  informed  judgment  of  the  condition  of  the 
banks. 
The  third  and  perhaps  most  serious  shortcoming 
of  the  classical  doctrine  is  its  failure  to  specify  the 
lender  of  last  resort’s  role  in  protecting  the  deposi- 
tors  and  noteholders  of  failed  banks.  When  a  poorly- 
managed  bank  fails  there  is good  reason  for  the  stock- 
holders  and  management  to  be  punished  by  losses. 
But  there  is  less  justification  for  the  depositors  and 
noteholders  having  to  bear  the  consequences  of  man- 
agement  errors.  Hence  it  may  be  desirable  that  some 
mechanism  be  established  to  transfer  the  deposit  and 
note  liabilities  of the  failed  bank,  together  with  match- 
ing  assets,  to  other  institutions.  Such  arranged 
mergers  may  take  time,  however.  During  the  transi- 
tion  period  the  central  bank  may  have  to  make  loans 
in  order  to  permit  the  merger  to  be  accomplished  in 
an  orderly  fashion.  Unfortunately,  there  is  no  recog- 
nition  of  this  possible  merger-facilitating  role  for  the 
central  bank  in  the  classical  doctrine. 
KEY  COMPONENTS  OF  THE CLASSICAL DOCTRINE 
This  article  has  sketched  the  development  of  the 
classical  concept  of  the  lender  of  last  resort  in  19th 
century  England  and  pointed  out  several  of the  short- 
comings  of  that  concept.  The  principal  conclusions 
can  be  stated  succinctly.  The  classical  doctrine  that 
emerged  during  the  19th  century  was  a predominantly 
market-oriented,  macroeconomic,  penalty-rate  con- 
cept  that  stressed  the  following  points: 
(1)  Assuming  the  central  bank  acts  appropriately 
in  a  crisis,  there  need  be  no  conflict  between  its 
monetary  control  and  lender  of  last  resort  duties. 
Prompt  and  vigorous  action  will  stop  any  panic 
before  the  money  supply  has  gotten  too  far  off  track. 
(2)  The  lender  of  last  resort’s  responsibility  is  to 
the  entire  financial  system  and  not  to  specific  institu- 
tions. 
(3)  The  lender  of  last  resort  exists  not  to  prevent 
the  occurrence  but  rather  to  neutralize  the  impact  of 
financial  shocks.  The  lender  must  prevent  the  spread 
of  shock  waves  through  the  financial  system. 
(4)  The  lender’s  duty  is  a  twofold  one  consisting 
first,  of  lending  without  stint  during  actual  panics 
and  second,  of  acknowledging  beforehand  its  duty  to 
lend  freely  in  all  future  panics. 
(5)  The  lender  should  be  willing  to  advance  indis- 
criminately  to  any  and  all  sound  borrowers  on  all 
sound  assets  no  matter  what  the  type. 
(6)  In  no  case  should  the  central  bank  accommo- 
date  unsound  borrowers.  The  lender’s  duty  lay  in 
preventing  panics  from  spreading  to  the  sound  insti- 
tutions,  and  not  in  rescuing  unsound  ones. 
(7) All  accommodation  would  occur  at  a  penalty 
rate,  i.e.,  the  central  bank  should  rely  on  price  rather 
than  non-price  mechanisms  to  ration  use  of  its  last- 
resort  lending  facility. 
(8)  The  overriding  objective  of  the  lender  of  last 
resort  was  to  prevent  panic-induced  declines  in  the 
money  stock  (Thornton)  or  at  least  the  gold-reserve 
component  of  the  monetary  base  (Bagehot). 
(9)  The  basic  strength  of  the  banking  system 
should  rest  not  on  the  availability  of  last  resort  loans 
but  on  the  resources  and  soundness  of  individual 
banks.  Sound  and  prudent  banking,  rather  than 
reliance  on  last-resort  accommodation,  is  the  hall- 
mark  of  a  secure  banking  system. 
Thomas  M.  Humphrey 
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